The commission was chaired by former FBI and CIA Director William Webster, which, under the circumstances seems a little like asking the fox to guard the henhouse because Hanssen was spying while Webster was director.

Anyway, the commission came out with a somewhat scathing 107 page report simply titled "A Review of FBI Security Programs." The report recommends many improved security steps, including more polygraph tests for agents and tightened access to secret information. "During our review of FBI security programs," the report states, "we found significant deficiencies in Bureau policy and practice. Those deficiencies flow from a pervasive inattention to security, which has been at best a low priority. In the Bureau, security is often viewed as an impediment to operations, and security responsibilities are seen as an impediment to career advancement."⁽¹⁾

That makes complete sense for a bureaucracy like the FBI. They police everyone but themselves. Agents like Hanssen had easy access to all sensitive information and he just copied off anything he wanted to sell to the Russians just as easily as we copy information from the Internet. The report continues:

"As shocking as the depth of Hanssen’s betrayal is the ease with which he was able to steal material he has described as ’tremendously useful’ and ’remarkably useful’ to hostile foreign powers. Hanssen usually collected this material in the normal routine of an FBI manager privy to classified information that crossed his desk or came up in conversation with colleagues. Before going to some prearranged ’drops’ with Soviet and Russian agents, Hanssen would simply ’grab the first thing [he] could lay [his] hands on.’ In preparation for other acts of espionage, which he might have months to anticipate, Hanssen was more systematic. He was proficient in combing FBI automated record systems, and he printed or downloaded to disk reams of highly classified information. Hanssen also did not hesitate to walk into Bureau units in which he had worked some time before, log on to stand-alone data systems, and retrieve, for example, the identities of foreign agents whom US intelligence services had compromised, information vital to American interests and even more immediately vital to those whose identities Hanssen betrayed."

In other words, there were no security standards within the FBI. Which, we should add, is an amazing statement coming from someone who was a director of the FBI. He could have and should have fixed all that while he was there. He’s admitting that he screwed up big time. So, now we get part of the fix:

"The recommendations we make are intended to address significant flaws in the process through which the Bureau generates and implements security policy and protocols for classified information. We believe that, if these recommendations are followed, a workplace culture will be established that recognizes security lapses as significant, restricts access to particular items of classified information to those who need them to perform their jobs, and makes disloyal employees more quickly visible. If these goals are met, the FBI will strike a sound balance between security and operational efficiency."

Webster is a bureaucrat. So, of course, his solution includes setting up yet another level of bureaucracy -- an office of Security, or internal computer cops:

"The Bureau’s Office of Security must develop programs to address information system security. Presently, no unit within the FBI adequately addresses this function, a failure whose consequences can be seen in Hanssen’s perfidy."

As usual, there is a public and a private version of the report. We peons who pay the bills do not get to see the good stuff. That’s only for the so called "honorable ones" on Capitol Hill.

But, any real report on the FBI should also include their illegal "black bag" jobs, the "testilying" by agents in court and the falsifying of evidence by their crime lab. The matter at Waco also needs to be revisited.

In truth, the FBI has done some very good work over the years. Yet, they have a number of bad apples still in residence that are stinking up the place.

For an interesting special report on the Webster Commission findings, see the May 6 edition of Insight Magazine.⁽²⁾